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THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
INTRODUCTION
The perpetration of a serious criminal offense is almost in-
variably followed by a strong desire on the part of the public
to be informed about all known circumstances surrounding the
crime and the possible suspects. This desire for information
motivates the news media to disseminate all known data and to
seek additional information from available sources as the inves-
tigation progresses. Few will deny that this zeal of the news
media serves many useful purposes. Extensive publicity of a
crime and the suspect's description may well be the decisive fac-
tor in obtaining prompt apprehension of the fugitive. It has
been suggested that, were it not for the pressure brought to bear
upon prosecuting authorities by publicity and news commentary,
many failures of justice might occur.' Also, a conscientious free
press can serve to better educate the public about the operation
of criminal justice and to promote thought and discussion as to
the probable causes of crime and the possible solutions thereof.2
Certain kinds of publicity, however, can conflict with the ac-
cused's right to due process of law during a criminal proceeding.
Paramount among these interferences3 is the effect prejudicial
publicity may have upon the accused's right to trial by an im-
partial jury.4 For purposes of discussion, this prejudicial pub-
licity is classified according to the time at which it occurs. If
the publicity arises prior to trial and tends to afford prospec-
1. See Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 504, 512 (1965). The
author suggests that the publicity in Pennekarp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946)
was designed to assure that justice was carried out. The long delay in arresting
Dr. Sheppard may also justify some of the publicity in that case. See Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.
1965), cert. granted, 86 Sup. Ct. 289 (1965). A further illustration pointed out
by the author is some publicity of the reluctance of southern authorities to prose-
cute persons suspected of or held for the killing of civil rights demonstrators.
2. Cf. Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and Criminal Justice, 50
A.B.A.J. 1125, 1128 (1964).
3. The recent case of Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), noted 43 TEXAS
L. REV. 922, involved a consideration of various other interferences with due
process of law which may result from publicity of a criminal proceeding. The
Court held that a "notorious" criminal trial could not be televised because of
the undesirable effects such action could produce on jurors, witnesses, the judge,
and the defendant himself. A discussion of this aspect of the publicity problem
is beyond the scope of this Comment.




tive jurors an opportunity to form opinions as to the defendant's
guilt before his actual trial, it is known as pre-trial prejudicial
publicity. If, instead, the publicity occurs during the trial and
places before jurors items of information or evidence which
should not be available for their deliberation, it is classified as
prejudicial publicity during the trial.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine each of these
types of prejudicial publicity in detail, considering the effective-
ness of various devices presently available to counteract the
prejudice, requirements the accused must meet to obtain these




The sixth amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees
that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a ... trial, by an impartial jury."5 Likewise, in every
state the right to be tried by an impartial jury is expressly or
implicitly guaranteed to an accused in most criminal cases.,
"The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even
the minimal standards of [state] due process."' This right to a
"fair hearing" or an impartial jury may be lost, however, when
extensive pre-trial prejudicial publicity occurs in the commu-
nity from which prospective jurors must be selected. It is ad-
mitted that the news media should be able to report general
material about the alleged crime, descriptions of the suspect in
order to help secure apprehension, and actual events in the
criminal proceeding, such as arrest of the accused, and the
charges brought against him." However, items of publicity such
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ......
6. See COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND, INDEX
DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 578, 579 (1959), cited in Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 722 (1961) ; Will, Free Press vs. Pair Trial, 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 197,
199 n.7 (1963); Note, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 349 (1960). Cf. LA. CONST. art. I,
§ 9: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury in accordance with the provisions of this con-
stitution ...... (As amended 1962.)
7. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). See also In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133 (1955) ; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
8. See Address by Attorney General Katzenbach, Free Press and Fair Trial,
American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1965 (hereinafter cited as
Katzenbach) ; Gelb, Fair Trials and Free Speech, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 607
(1963) ; Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 217 (1963).
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as pre-trial disclosures of confessions or of the fact that the
accused has confessed, 9 uncounseled interviews with the ac-
cused, 10 prior criminal records or activities, 1 inadmissible evi-
dence,' 2 pre-trial statements by witnesses,' failure of the accused
to take a lie detector test,' 4 pre-trial statements by counsel as
to the merits of the case,' sensationalism in reporting the facts
of the case,'0 denunciatory appellations of the accused, 17 inter-
viewing the public before trial on the question of guilt or inno-
cence of the accused and possible punishment," and general edi-
torial comments as to guilt or innocence 19 are generally unde-
9. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S.
50 (1951). No defendant can be convicted upon evidence which includes an in-
voluntary confession, regardless of the truth of the confession, Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), and regardless of independent evidence sufficient to
sustain a finding of guilt, Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) ; Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
Since the jury is not entitled to know or to consider in its deliberation the fact
that a defendant has confessed or the contents of his confession unless and until
that confession is found to be voluntary and therefore admissible in evidence, the
publication of his confession or even of the fact that he has confessed before its
admission is prejudicial. See Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 217, 241 (1963).
10. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
11. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) ; United States v. Accardo, 298
F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Milanovich, 303 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 876 (1962) ; United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962). But see Katzenbach.
12. Neither in federal nor in state courts may a defendant be convicted by
means of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against
illegal search and seizure. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Obviously, if
publicity makes the jury aware of such inadmissible evidence, this constitutional
safeguard is irreparably damaged. However, publication of the discovery of in-
admissible evidence, which does not connect the accused with the crime, should
not constitute prejudicial publicity. See Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 217, 243
(1963).
13. Where a newspaper publishes an out-of-court statement concerning the
accused and the person making the statement is not called as a witness, the
defendant's right of confrontation may be abridged. See Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) ; In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257 (1948). Even where the maker of the out-of-court statement is
later called as a witness, the jury is liable to overestimate his credibility because
of the prior publication, and consequently give the statement greater weight than
evidence more favorable to the defendant which is brought out for the first time
during the trial. See Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 217, 243 (1963).
14. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964), rev'd, 346
F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 86 Sup. Ct. 289 (1965).
15. See Fouquette v. Bernard, 198 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1952) (prosecuting at-
torney stated he was convinced that defendant was sane before, during, and after
the murders)..
16. See Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and Criminal Justice, 50
A.B.A.J. 1125 (1964).
17. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) ; United States v. Accardo, 298
F.2d 133 (1962) ; People v. Genovese, 10 N.Y.2d 473, 180 N.E.2d 419 (1962) ;
Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and Criminal Justice, 50 A.B.A.J.
1125 (1964).
18. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
19. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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sirable because of their inflammatory and prejudicial effects.





An accused, faced with prejudicial pre-trial publicity, has
various procedural remedies available to help assure a fair
and impartial trial. A brief examination of each of these reme-
dies will reveal their inadequacies.
Change of Venue
Federal procedure 22 and all state procedures2 provide for a
change of venue in criminal proceedings when the defendant is
unable to obtain a fair and impartial trial in the jurisdiction
where the crime has been committed. In both federal and state
courts, the motion for change of venue is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court whose ruling will not be disturbed
by the reviewing court unless it is clearly erroneous or an abuse
of discretion. 24 Often the trial court will postpone ruling on the
motion until after the voir dire examination in order to ascertain
whether a fair and impartial trial is available to the defendant.2 5
In Louisiana the defendant may apply to the trial court for
a change of venue if he has good reason to believe that "by rea-
son of prejudice existing in the public mind or some other suf-
ficient cause, described by him, an impartial trial cannot be
obtained in the parish wherein the indictment is pending. '26 The
20. Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and Criminal Justice, 50
A.B.A.J. 1125 (1964).
21. Because of the limited availability of contempt citations as an existing
remedy, discussion of contempt process has been relegated to consideration of pro-
posed solutions for prejudicial publicity. See discussion accompanying notes 143-
157- infra.
22. FED. R. CRim. P. 21(a) : "The court upon motion of the defendant shall
transfer the proceedings as to him to another district or division if the court is
satisfied that there exists in the district or division where the prosecution is pend-
ing so great a prejudice against the defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and
impartial trial in that district or division."
23. See Note, 60 COLUA. L. REV. 349, 360 (1960), where it is pointed out
that the power of trial courts to grant changes of venue is embodied in the con-
stitutions of twelve states and in all other states removal of criminal causes in
certain specified situations has been authorized by statute or rule of court. Cf.
LA. R.S. 15:289-301 (1950).
24. See Hoffa v. Gray, 323 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
907 (1963) ; Shockley v. United States, 166 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 850 (1948).
25. E.g., Hoffa v. Gray, 323 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1963), dert. denied, 375 U.S.
907 (1963) ; United States v. Dioguardi, 147 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
26. LA. R.S. 15:292 (1950). The proposed revision to the Code of Criminal
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Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently held that the burden
of establishing the existence of such prejudice as to preclude
the possibility of a fair trial rests with the applicant for a change
of venue,27 and inflammatory newspaper articles by themselves
have not been deemed by the courts to be particularly strong evi-
dence of such prejudice.28 The theory often advanced to demon-
strate the supposed insignificance of such publicity is that these
journalistic outbursts constitute the usual newspaper approach
to getting a "good story," rather than an indication of wide-
spread public resentment or antagonism against the accused.29
Louisiana follows the traditional approach that a motion for
change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court, whose ruling will not be overturned absent an affirma-
tive showing of clear abuse of that discretion. 30  The justifica-
tion presented for this rule is that the trial judge has a better
opportunity to evaluate the evidence supporting a claim of preju-
Procedure almost identically tracls the language of article 292, adding, however,
a provision that "in deciding whether to grant a change of venue the court shall
consider whether the prejudice, the influence or the other reasons are such that
they will affect the answers of jurors on the voir dire examination...." LouISI-
ANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROJET OF CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 622
(1966). The purpose of this language, as indicated by the Reporter's comments,
is to assure that the criteria for granting a change of venue are not limited by
the grounds for challenge of a prospective juror for cause: "[T]he change of
venue concept should operate where the state of the public mind against the
defendant is such that jurors will not completely answer honestly upon their voir
dire." Id. comment (b).
27. State v. Lejeune, 181 So. 2d 392 (La. 1965); State v. Rideau, 242 La.
431, 137 So. 2d 283 (1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); State v. Rogers, 241
La. 841, 132 So. 2d 819 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 963 (1962); State v.
Scott, 237 La. 71, 110 So. 2d 530 (1959) ; State v. Faciane, 233 La. 1028, 99
So.2d 333 (1957).
28. State v. Lejeune, 181 So. 2d 392 (La. 1965); State v. Faciane, 233 La.
1028, 99 So. 2d 333 (1957) ; State v. Pearson, 224 La. 393, 69 So. 2d 512 (1953) ;
State v. Roberson, 159 La. 562,. 105 So. 621 (1925) ; State v. Rini, 153 La. 57,
95 So. 400 (1922). It should be noted, however, that this rule might not pertain
where the pre-trial publicity was so inflammatory as to convince the court that
the defendant's rights probably were prejudiced. See discussion of State v. Mont-
gomery, 181 So. 2d 756 (La. 1966) in text accompanying notes 44-47 infra. In
this case the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the denial of defendant's motion
for a continuance, based on an atmosphere permeated with prejudice, was re-
versible error. Because the conviction had to be reversed on this ground, the
court did not decide whether the denial of defendant's motion for change of venue
was also error, stating that "at present we are unable to pass upon whether
or not he will be entitled to a change of venue in the future." Id. at 758.
29. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court jor the 1957-1958 Term-
Criminal Procedure, 19 LA. L. REV. 405, 416 (1959) ; The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1953-1954 Term-Criminal Procedure, 15 LA. L. REv.
348, 351 (1955).
30. State v. Lejeune, 181 So. 2d 392 (La. 1965) ; State v. Rideau, 242 La.
431, 137 So. 2d 283 (1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) ; State v. Rogers, 241
La. 841, 132 So. 2d 819 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 963 (1962) ; State v.
Wilson, 240 La. 1087, 127 So. 2d 158 (1961) ; State v. Scott, 237 La. 71, 110
COMMENTS
dice than does the appellate court which has only a cold record.3 '
In upholding the denial of the motion for change of venue, em-
phasis has been placed on the fact that the defendant did not
exhaust his peremptory challenges, thereby substantiating the
conclusion that the prejudice was not so strong as to prevent
a fair and impartial trial.32
When faced with a motion for change of venue because of
alleged prejudicial pre-trial publicity, a trial judge in Louisiana
may call witnesses to testify whether they believe the defendant
can obtain a fair and impartial trial despite the publicity, rather
than postpone decision on the motion until after the voir dire
examination.3 3 A favorable indication by most of these witnesses
will generally support a denial of the requested relief.
Change of venue is usually not an effective remedy. Aside
from the fact that relief is sparingly granted,3 4 the defendant
often cannot be sure that prejudicial publicity has not preceded
him into the jurisdiction to which the trial has been moved.85
As one federal judge phrased it, "it is difficult to outrun the
press."3 6 Moreover, at least in federal criminal proceedings, the
defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by an impartial
jury in the district wherein the crfme was allegedly committed. 87
As pointed out in Delaney v. United States38 the defendant should
not be forced to forego this right by having to move for a change
of venue in order to avoid prejudicial publicity. In any event,
if venue has to be changed to a location sufficiently distant to
So. 2d 530 (1959) ; State v. Faciane, 233 La. 1028, 99 So. 2d 333 (1957) ; State
v. Sheffield, 232 La. 53, 93 So. 2d 691 (1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 915 (1957),
rehearing denied, 354 U.S. 943 (1957) ; State v. Swails, 226 La. 441, 76 So. 2d
523 (1954) ; State v. Johnson, 226 La. 30, 74 So. 2d 402 (1954) ; State v. Wash-
ington, 207 La. 849, 22 So. 2d 193 (1945) ; State v. Price, 192 La. 615, 188 So.
719 (1939) ; State v. Roberson, 159 La. 562, 105 So. 621 (1925).
31. See State v. Collier, 161 La. 856, 109 So. 516 (1926) ; State v. Roberson,
159 La. 562, 105 So. 621 (1925) ; State v. Powell, 109 La. 727, 33 So. 748 (1903) ;
"he Work of the Louisiana S upreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term-Criminal
Procedure, 19 LA. L. REv. 405, 416 (1959).
32. E.g., State v. Washington, 207 La. 849, 22 So. 2d 193 (1945) (only nine
of the twelve peremptory challenges exhausted) ; State v. Price, 192 La. 615, 188
So. 718 (1939) (one peremptory challenge not used).
33. See State v. Rideau, 242 La. 431, 137 So. 2d 283 (1962), rev'd, 373 U.S.
723 (1963); State v. Rogers, 241 La. 841, 132 So. 2d 819 (1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 963 (1962).
34. See, e.g., Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); Meador v. United
States, 341 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1965).
35. Cf. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
36. Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and Criminal Justice, 50
A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126 (1964).
37. See. note 5 supra.
38. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 11.6 (1st Cir. 1952).
1966]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
relieve the effects of adverse publicity, the scene of the crime
will usually be out of reach of the court during trial, thereby
making it impossible for the judge and jury to view the scene
should this be desirable.3 9 Finally, it must be recognized that
an accused, who is forced to move for change of venue to avoid
prejudicial publicity, is put to the additional expense of having
to support his lawyer and witnesses away from their homes.40
Continuance
A defendant, in order to allow pre-trial publicity to abate,
may move for a continuance in federal and most state criminal
proceedings. 1 As in the case of a motion for change of venue,
decision on the motion for a continuance is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and is not reversible except when
there has been an abuse of that discretion.4 2 Likewise, the trial
court will usually look first at the voir dire examination to de-
termine whether an impartial jury can be obtained before ruling
on the motion.43
A recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision reflects a more
liberal position on the part of that court with respect to the
demonstration of prejudice required to support a motion for con-
39. Comment, 44 NEB. L. REV. 614, 619 (1965).
40. FREE PRESS -FAIR TRIAL (A REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF A CON-
FERENCE ON PREJUDICIAL NEWS REPORTING IN CRIMINAL CASES 14 (1964) (here-
inafter cited as FREE PRESS -FAIR TRIAL).
41. See Note, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 349, 367, 368 (1960), where it is pointed
out that the power to postpone a trial is inherent in the court as an incident
of the power to hear and determine causes, and only one state (Arizona) has not
recognized the availability of continuance as a method of offsetting hostile senti-
ment in the community. For a liberal view towards granting continuance in fed-
eral prosecutions see Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952). For
Louisiana's provisions on continuance see LA. R.S. 15:318-326 (1950).
42. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962) ; Delaney v. United States,
199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952) ; cf. LA. R.S. 15:320 (1950) : "The granting or re-
fusing of any continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge; pro-
vided, that any arbitrary or unreasonable abuse of such discretion may be re-
viewed by the proper appellate tribuqal on appeal . . ."; State v. Martinez, 220
La. 899, 57 So. 2d 888 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952) ; State v. Ford,
37 la. Ann. 443 (1885). The only exception in Louisiana to this discretionary
nature of the granting or refusing of a continuance is LA. R.S. 15:326 (1950),
which provides that whenever ain attorney employed as leading counsel is a mem-
ber of the state legislature and is unable to attend court because the legislature
is in session, a continuance must be granted. Except for the above situation
and the case where both the state and the defendant request a continuance, the
Revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure retains the rule that a motion for
continuance, if tinely filed, may be granted in the court's discretion in any case
if there is good ground therefor. See LOUISIANA STATE LA'W INSTITUTE, PROJET
OF TuE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE arts. 712, 713, and comments thereunder
(1966).
43. See note 25 snpra.
[Vol. XXVI
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tinuance. In State v. Montgomery44 a Negro defendant was in-
dicted for the murder of an East Baton Rouge Parish deputy
sheriff. On January 22 the City-Parish Council, in order to
promote contributions to a memorial fund for the victim's fam-
ily, proclaimed January 27- the same date as that set for de-
fendant's trial- as a day of memorial for the victim. 45 The
local newspapers carried stories about the fund-raising drive,
including pictures of the widow. One newspaper article pointed
out that the selected memorial day coincided with defendant's
trial date. News accounts of the crime, when referring to the
accused, frequently used the alias "Wolfman." Finally, there
was a newspaper account of cross-burnings which had been
occurring in the state, including one on the state capitol grounds.
The Supreme Court recited the general rule that granting or
refusing a continuance is within the sound discretion of the
trial judge whose ruling will not be disturbed except where it
is arbitrary or unreasonable, but held that under these cir-
cumstances the denial of defendant's motion for continuance
violated substantial rights of the accused, thereby requiring
reversal of his conviction. It is significant to note that there
was no indication that the defendant had exhausted his per-
emptory challenges or that he had been forced to accept an ob-
noxious juror.46 Indeed, the court admitted that it could not
state as a fact that the jury was not impartial, but such a find-
ing was not a prerequisite for reversing the conviction. 7
The theory that the motion for a continuance is an effective
remedy for pre-trial publicity is that with the passage of time
the publicity will become stale and jurors will not give it much
weight in view of the freshly presented evidence in court.48 The
problem with this theory is that there is no assurance that pros-
pective jurors will forget what has been written or broadcast,
and even if they do, there is nothing to prevent the news media
from renewing prejudicial comment as the new trial date ap-
44. 181 So. 2d 756 (La. 1966).
45. The general chairman of the fund testified that the date suggested for
the memorial was merely an "appropriate time" and that he was not then aware
that it coincided with the date set for trial. Id. at 761.
46. Id. at 762 (dissenting opinion).
47. Id. at 762: "We cannot say that the jury which rendered the instant ver-
dict was not impartial . . . but we conclude that the substantial rights of the
accused suffered as a result of the denial of his motion for a continuance. There-
fore, no one could reasonably say that the verdict and the sentence were lawfully
obtained."
48. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 306 F.2d 596, 603 (2d Cir. 1962)
Palakiko v. Harper, 209 F.2d 75, 98 (9th Cir. 1953).
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proaches. A further difficulty is that the quality of the case
for both sides may suffer with the passage of time, as wit-
nesses become unavailable or their recollections become hazy,
thereby creating a problem of preserving evidence. A possible
constitutional issue exists, at least in federal courts, if the ac-
cused is forced to move for a continuance and thereby give up
his right to a speedy trial.4 9 Finally, if a defendant is indigent
and cannot obtain release through bail or upon his own recog-
nizance, he must remain in custody during the continuance.
These various difficulties demonstrate the inadequacy of this
remedy.
Voir Dire
The theory behind the voir dire remedy is that an impartial
jury can be obtained, despite pre-trial prejudicial publicity,
through use of a combination of peremptory challenges and
challenges for cause.50 The Louisiana Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure provides that the accused shall have twelve peremptory
challenges where he is on trial for a crime punishable by death,
or necessarily punishable with imprisonment at hard labor, and
six peremptory challenges in all other criminal trials.51 The
Code further provides that an accused may challenge a pros-
pective juror for cause on the ground that he is not impartial;
however, a mere opinion held by the prospective juror as to
guilt or innocence is not sufficient ground for challenge unless
the opinion is fixed, deliberately formed, would not yield to the
evidence, or could not be changed.52 In applying this provision
the Louisiana Supreme Court has been reluctant to overturn
the decision of the trial judge denying the challenge for cause,58
largely because this disposition is within the sound discretion
49. See note 5 supra and LA. CONST. art. I, § 9, quoted in note 6 supra. Cf.
LA. R.S. 15:318 (1950) : "In all criminal prosecutions the state, as well as the
accused, shall have the right to a speedy public trial."
50. See FED. R. CRim. P. 24. For a general discussion of Louisiana's provi-
sions relative to voir doir examination and challenges of prospective jurors see
Slovenko, The Jury System in Louisiana Criminal Law, 17 LA. L. REV. 655
(1957).
51. LA. R.S. 15:354 (1950). These same provisions are retained in the Revi-
sion. See LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROJET OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE art. 799 (1966).
52. LA. R.S. 15:351(1) (1950).
53. various Louisiana cases where challenges for cause due to alleged preju-
dicial publicity were unsuccessful include State v. Rideau, 242 La. 431, 137 So. 2d
283 (1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 723 (1.963) ; State v. Rogers, 241 La. 841, 132 So. 2d
819 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 963 (1962) ; State v. Sheffield, 232 La. 53, 93
So. 2d 691 (1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 915 (1957) ; rehearing denied, 354 U.S.
[Vol. XXVI
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of the trial judge, 54 and he alone has had the benefit of observ-
ing the prospective juror's demeanor on voir dire examination. 55
However, the Supreme Court has reversed convictions where it
appeared from the voir dire record that an unsuccessfully chal-
lenged juror actually entered the case with an initial belief of
guilt which would require evidence of innocence to change,50
where the juror qualified his fixed opinion by stating that it
"would probably yield to the evidence," 57 and where the juror
stated he "thought" his opinion would yield to the evidence pre-
sented.5
8
Although these state standards are subject to the constitu-
tional due process requirements which will be examined subse-
quently, it suffices to say that the voir dire examination, like
the other procedural remedies, has its limitations. One disadvan-
tage is that use of the voir'dire compounds the prejudice by
bringing the pre-trial publicity once again and more specifically
to the jurors' attention. 59 Further, the voir dire covers only the
particular pre-trial influences defense counsel and the judge
ask about. Moreover, it uncovers only those influences the pros-
pective juror both remembers and is not too embarrassed to
943 (1957) ; State v. Futch, 216 La. 857, 44 So. 2d 892 (1950) ; State v. Davis,
214 La. 831, 39 So. 2d 76 (1949); State v. Henry, 200 La. 875, 9 So. 2d 215
(1942); State v. Bass, 186 La. 139, 171 So. 829 (1937); State v. Genna, 163
La. 701, 112 So. 655 (1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 522 (1928); State v. Rober-
son, 159 La. 562, 105 So. 621 (1925) State v. Rini, 153 La. 57, 95 So. 400
(1923), dismissed, 263 U.S. 689 (1924) State v. Birbiglia, 149 La. 4, 88 So. 533
(1921).
54. LA. R.S. 15:345 (1950). See also cases cited in note 48 supra, almost all
of which invoke the discretionary rule.
55. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-1954 Term-
Criminal Procedure, 15 LA. L. REV. 348, 363 (1955).
56. State v. Oliphant, 220 La. 489, 56 So. 2d 846 (1952).
57. State v. Thornhill, 188 La. 762, 178 So. 343 (1937) (only an opinion
which could definitely yield to the evidence would be acceptable).
58. State v. Henry, 197 La. 999, 3 So. 2d 104 (1941) (opinion must readily
yield to the evidence). The position adopted by the,Revision is that a prospective
juror cannot be challenged for cause merely because he has an opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of the defendant, provided the court is satisfied that he is
impartial, despite his opinion. If evidence will be required to overcome the opinion
of guilt, however, the juror may be challenged for cause, because the accused
is presumed innocent until proved 'guilty and he should therefore not have to bear
the burden of overcoming the opinion. See LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE,
PROJET OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 797 (1966) : "The state or the
defendant may challenge a juror for cause on any of the following grounds: . ..
(2) That the juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. An
opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of
itself be sufficient ground for challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is
satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the
evidence .... ." See also id. comment (b).
59. Meyer, Free Press v. Fair Trial: Two Views: The Judges' View, 41
N.D.L. REV. 14 (1964).
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admit. A half-forgotten headline may seem to a juryman too
trivial to mention, yet it may have planted the seed that changes
a vote in the jury room.60
Waiver of Jury Trial
If none of the preceding procedural remedies is available to
the accused, or if he believes that none of them will be effective,
the most drastic method of avoiding trial by a jury subjected
to prejudicial pre-trial publicity is waiver of a jury trial. 61
Under the federal rules a defendant cannot waive this right
unless he does so "in writing with the approval of the court
and the consent of the government. '6 2 Although the avowed pur-
pose of this restriction is to protect the rights of the accused,
in certain instances the statute may have the effect of compelling
the defendant to proceed to trial before a prejudiced jury.68
Reversal of Conviction
If it is found by a reviewing court that adverse publicity
resulted in a lack of due process, or caused a federal trial to fall
below the required standards for federal criminal justice,64 the
accused may obtain a reversal of his conviction. Although this
remedy will generally assure that the defendant is not convicted
without having a fair trial, its greatest inadequacy is that it
fails to provide any sanction against the offending news media.
If a conviction is reversed because of a faulty ruling by the trial
judge, or because of the conduct of attorneys prior to or during
the trial, the reversal has the effect of penalizing the party who
was in error by forcing him to do his work again. 5 A reversal
of a case solely because of adverse publicity, however, results in
no such punishment to the news media, and indeed merely af-
fords them another trial to publicize. Such reversals are merely
"an expedient and not a cure." 66
60. Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and Criminal Justice, 50
A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126 (1964).
61. See generally Donnelly, The Defendant's Reight To Waive Jury Trial
in Criminal Cases, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 247 (1956); Cf. LA. R.S. 15:259, 342
(1950).
62. FED. R. CRHim. 1'. 23(a), upheld in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24
(1965).
63. ee Comment, 33 FORDIHAM L. REV. 61, 72 (1964)
64. For an analysis of these standards see discussion accompanying notes
67-93 infra.
65. Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 197, 209, 210 (1963).
66. State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 387, 204 A.2d 841, 851 (1964), cert.




Even assuming the existing procedural remedies could ade-
quately counteract the adverse effects of pre-trial publicity, the
defendant has the additional problem of qualifying for such
relief.
In determining whether a prospective juror can meet the
requirement of impartiality the test usually invoked is whether
the juror can render a verdict based solely on the evidence pre-
sented in court.6 7 It has been recognized that to insist that a
prospective juror know nothing about the case or have been
exposed to no pre-trial publicity would be to establish an "im-
possible standard."6 8 With respect to a notorious criminal case,
only the mentally deficient, or the most uninformed, would be
unexposed to the pre-trial publicity, and these are not the most
desirable jurors. Consequently, the fact that a prospective juror
has formulated some preconceived notion as to the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused is not per se sufficient to disqualify him
from duty. Usually, if the juror is able to testify on voir dire
examination that he can disregard his opinion and decide the
case solely on the evidence presented during the trial he will
be deemed to meet the requirements of impartiality. 69 This tra-
ditional approach, however, of labeling a prospective juror "im-
partial" on the basis of his affirmative statement that he can
disregard his preconceived opinion has recently been abandoned
in certain instances where the prejudicial pre-trial publicity was
intensive and extensive and the community prejudice was per-
vasive. To ascertain the present standards, a review of the juris-
prudence will be helpful.
The first modern case to reach the United States Supreme
Court involving contentions of deprivation of state due process
because of prejudicial pre-trial publicity was Shepherd v. Flor-
ida, in 1951.70 A newspaper reported that the defendants had
confessed to rape, and it named the sheriff as the source of the
information. In a per curiam opinion the court reversed the con-
victions, apparently on the ground of racial discrimination in
jury selection. Concurring Justices Jackson and Frankfurter
67. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Spies v. Illinois, 123
U.S. 131 (1887); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
68. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 723 (1961.
69. Id. at 723.
70. 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
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felt that reversal should have been on the basis of the pre-trial
publicity. 71
In the following year the Supreme Court refused to reverse
a murder conviction in Stroble v. California72 despite peti-
tioner's claim that a fair trial was impossible owing to inflam-
matory newspaper articles. The press had published the ac-
cused's confession; had variously described him as a "werewolf,"
"fiend," and "sex-mad killer"; and had printed the prosecutor's
pre-trial statement that the accused was guilty and sane. How-
ever, petitioner first raised his objection after conviction, had
not moved for a change of venue,73 and did not attempt to prove
that the jurors were in fact prejudiced by the publications. The
Court held that petitioner failed to establish a denial of due
process on the basis of the prejudicial publicity alone. This
same standard was reiterated in United States ex rel. Darcy v.
Handy.71 Petitioner sought habeas corpus on the basis that his
state robbery conviction was unconstitutional owing to preju-
dicial pre-trial publicity. In denying relief the Court noted that
petitioner had not exhausted his peremptory challenges, nor
moved for a change of venue or a continuance; indeed, he raised
the issue for the first time three years after the trial.75 The
Court held petitioner had failed to establish partiality of the
jury.
Thus, the standard for state due process seemed to be that
the presence of prejudicial pre-trial publicity in and of itself
was insufficient to establish that an accused had been denied a
fair trial.
The Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd,76 however, was pre-
sented with a case of extreme pre-trial prejudicial publicity and
with extensive, albeit fruitless, efforts on the part of the peti-
tioner to obtain relief from the prejudice. The publicity included
71. Justice Jackson felt the Court's action stressed the trivial and ignored
the important. He reasoned that even if there had been no discrimination in the
jury selection, the community hostility was so great that as a practical matter
no Negro juror would have dared to vote for acquittal. Id. at 54, 55.
72. 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
73. The Court said that dsfendant's failure to so move was not dispositive
but was significant in determining whether there hail been a denial of due process.
Jd. at 193, 194.
74. 351 U.S. 454 (1956).
75. The Court again stated that these omissions on the part of the defendant
were not dispositive but were significant. id. at 463.
76. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
[Vol. XXVI
COMMENTS
accounts of the accused's prior criminal activity, his confession
to the six murders, editorial commentary as to his lack of re-
morse and that he had been found sane by a court-appointed
panel of doctors, an alleged offer by the accused to plead guilty
for a life sentence, the determination of the prosecutor to obtain
the death penalty, and other derogatory comments. Petitioner
demonstrated that ninety per cent of the prospective jurors ad-
mitted having some preconceived opinion as to his guilt, and that
eight of the twelve jurors selected felt he was guilty, although
each of these eight stated he could render an impartial verdict.
Petitioner had exhausted his peremptory challenges, and had
made various unsuccessful motions for a change of venue and
for a continuance." The Supreme Court struck down the state
court conviction holding that the "pattern of deep and bitter
prejudice" clearly reflected in the sum total of the voir dire
examination required that the jurors' assertions of impartiality
be disregarded.
Reasoning similar to that in Irvin had previously been ap-
plied by at least one lower federal court to a state conviction.
In United States ex rel. Sheffield v. Waller,18 petitioner sought
habeas corpus on the basis that his Louisiana conviction was
unconstitutional and the United States District Court granted
the requested relief.7 9 Petitioner was convicted of murdering
a police officer, and his trial was preceded by extensive pre-
trial publicity, including alleged admissions by the accused of
guilt and his lack of remorse. The federal court felt that these
highly prejudicial news stories made it humanly impossible for
the prospective jurors to be impartial, their answers on voir dire
examination to the contrary notwithstanding.80
77. The defendant was granted a change of venue to the adjoining county,
but was denied further changes of venue, despite his contentions that the
prejudicial publicity had made a fair trial impossible in the new trial location,
apparently because the pertinent state statute allowed only one change of venue.
Id. at 720. Compare I.A. R.S. 15:294 (1950) and construction thereof under
similar circumstances by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Rideau, 246
La. 451, 165 So.2d 282 (1964).
78. 126 F. Supp. 537 (W.D. La. 1954), certificate denied, 224 F.2d 280 (5th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 922 (1955).
79. The court concluded that the "totality of facts" indicated that petitioner
did not receive due process of law. Id. at 546.
80. Id. at 542: "Whatever may have been the responses of the prospective
jurors, on voir dire, as to the impressions these highly prejudicial news stories had
made on their minds, in our judgment they humanly could not have divorced them
from their thoughts." The state was given a limited time in which to continue
proceedings against the accused; at a new trial defendant was again convicted
of murder and sentenced to death. State v. Sheffield, 232 La. 53, 93 So. 2d 691
(1957) ; cert. denied, 354 U.S. 915 (1957), rehearing denied, 354 U.S. 943 (1957).
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Purporting to apply the same standards used in Irvin, the
Supreme Court in 1962 refused to reverse Dave Beck's grand
larceny conviction in Beck v. Washington."' Although petitioner
had exhausted his peremptory challenges and had unsuccessfully
moved for change of venue and for continuance, he had not chal-
lenged any of the selected jurors for cause as had petitioner in
Irvin. The Court stated that this was "strong evidence" that he
was convinced the jury was not prejudiced against him. Further,
the Court held that petitioner had not demonstrated that "the
pre-trial publicity was so intensive and extensive" that a court
could not believe the answers of the jurors on voir dire.82
Some lower federal courts have held that deviation from
the standard of Irvin is permitted only in "extreme factual sit-
uations, '8 3 and such a position is supportable when Beck is con-
sidered. However, other courts have rejected the "extreme fac-
tual situation" limitation.8 4
The latest disposition by the Supreme Court in this area is
Rideau v. Louisiana.8 ' Rideau was tried for murder. Among the
pre-trial publicity objected to was the televising of his "inter-
view" with the sheriff at which he "confessed" to the alleged
crimes. Having exhausted his peremptory challenges, the ac-
cused challenged three prospective jurors for cause because they
admitted on voir dire examination that they had seen the tele-
vised "interview" at least once, but these challenges, as well as
his motion for change of venue, were denied. The Court re-
versed the conviction, "without pausing to examine a particu-
larized transcript of the voir dire examination of the members
of the jury,"' 6 on the basis that due process was denied by the
refusal to grant the requested change of venue.8 7
81. 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
82. The Court showed that only 14 out of 52 prospective jurors had precon-
ceived opinions as to defendant's guilt, whereas in Irvin 90% of those examined
on the point entertained some opinion as to guilt. Id. at 556, 557.
83. See, e.g., Geagan v. Gavin, 292 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 903 (1962).
84. E.g., United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
85. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
86. It was this refusal by the majority to examine the voir dire record to
determine whether the jurors' assurance of impartiality should be disregarded
which provoked strong dissent from Justices Clark and Harlan. Id. at 727.
87. Id. at 727: "[D]ue process of law in this case required a trial before a




It is clear, therefore, that where a jury is used in a state
criminal proceeding, failure to provide an impartial one consti-
tutes denial of due process. In general, it will be held that im-
partiality can exist even though the prospective juror has formed
some preconceived opinion, provided he states on voir dire ex-
amination that he can disregard his opinion and decide the case
solely on the evidence presented. However, if in extent and
nature the pre-trial publicity is so prejudicial that the reviewing
court feels an impartial jury is objectively impossible, it will
reverse the conviction. More significance seemingly is being
placed on the prejudicial nature of the publicity itself; in cer-
tain instances the publicity per se will appear so prejudicial to
the court that it will presume partiality without looking to the
voir dire record for actual indications of bias.s8
As is to be expected, the standard in federal courts with
respect to an impartial jury in federal criminal proceedings
is somewhat higher than that required for state due process.
There has not yet been a Supreme Court decision explicitly deal-
ing with the problem of pre-trial prejudicial publicity in a fed-
eral prosecution. 89 What authority there is comes from federal
courts of appeals. Exercising their supervisory power over fed-
eral district courts, most appellate courts seemingly have re-
quired that the jurors have no preconceived opinions as to the
defendant's guilt or innocence,90 although the fact that jurors
have read the prejudicial publicity will not per se disqualify
them, at least where the accused has not exhausted his per-
emptory challenges.9 1 A few appellate cases have indicated that
88. State cases illustrating situations where newspaper accounts were held
to be so prejudicial that juror's assertions of impartiality had to be disregarded
include People v. Hlryciuk, 5 Ill. 2d 176, 125 N.E.2d 61 (1954) ; State v. Bowden,
62 N.J. Super. 339, 162 A.2d 911 (1960) ; State v. Claypool, 135 Wash. 295, 237
Pac. 730 (1925).
89. See Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 1952). The
leading Supreme Court cases involving general supervisory power over federal
trials affected by publicity deal with prejudicial publicity during the trial. See
discussion of Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) and Janko v.
United States, 366 U.S. 716 (1961) under prejudicial publicity during the trial,
text accompanying notes 105, 106 infra.
90. No case was found where a prospective juror in a federal trial was allowed
to serve where he admitted having a preconceived opinion as to guilt or innocence.
The following cases took special note of the fact that none of the jurors finally
selected harbored any preconceived opinion: Meador v. United States, 341 F.2d
381 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Shaffer, 291 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 915 (1.961) ; Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941), rehearing denied, 314 U.S. 706
(1942).
91. See, e.g., Meador v. United States, 341 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1965) ; United
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the jury might even have to be composed of individuals who
have not seen or read the prejudicial pre-trial publicity.92 One
federal court of appeals has held that where the prejudicial pre-
trial publicity was largely the responsibility of the federal gov-
ernment, a failure to grant the defendant's motion for a con-
tinuance was reversible error, even though he had not exhausted
his peremptory challenges nor moved for a change of venue.9
In so holding, the court in effect presumed the selected jury had
read the publicity and therefore was partial without looking at
the voir dire for specific indications of partiality.
II. PUBLICITY ARISING DURING THE TRIAL
The basic problem encountered with prejudicial publicity
arising during the trial itself is that information which ordi-
narily would not be revealed to the jury, because its inflam-
matory effect outweighs its value in the quest for truth, never-
theless is made available to the jury through the news media.9 4
Indeed, the prejudicial effect is probably greater for the fact
noted by the Supreme Court that the revelation is "not tem-
pered by protective procedures"9 5 such as cross-examination.
Also, with this type of adverse publicity, the argument that the
prejudice will abate with the passage of time is not applicable,
for here the impression on the juror is immediate.
A. Existing Remedies96
Three procedural remedies have been used to counteract ad-
verse publicity during the trial. However, like the remedies
States v. Milanovich, 303 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 876
(1962); United States v. Shaffer, 291 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 915 (1961) ; Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941), rehearing denied, 314 U.S. 706 (1942).
92. See United States ex rel. Brown v. Smith, 306 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1962)
Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
575 (1941), rehearing denied, 314 U.S. 706 (1942). But cf. Meador v. United
States, 341 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Shaffer, 291 F.2d 689
(7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 915 (1961). Such a requirement is the
generally recognized standard with respect to prejudicial publicity during a fed-
eral trial. See discussion in text accompanying notes 104-115 infra.
93. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952).
94. Cases in which the court found publicity of proceedings from which the
jury had been excluded to have been prejudicial to the rights of the accused include
Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
855 (1961) ; Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 997 (1952) ; United States v. Powell, 171 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
95. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313 (1959).
96. See note 21 supra.
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available for prejudicial pre-trial publicity, these also have dis-
advantages.
Cautionary Instructions
It is generally recognized that a trial judge should instruct
the jury that it is not to read about or discuss the case, and that
its deliberations should concern only matters presented during
the trial itself. It has been held that failure so to instruct, at
least when requested, is reversible error.9 7
Although this device seems conceptually ideal, in practice it
fails to protect the defendant's rights because jurors may dis-
regard cautionary instructions and fail to admit it on inter-
rogation for fear of condemnation by the court.98
Isolation (Sequestration) of the Jury
Another procedural device which can be used to avoid preju-
dicial publicity during the trial is isolation or sequestration of
the jury, which is intended to shield the jurors from any outside
influence.
In capital cases Louisiana law requires automatic isolation
of each juror from the moment of his acceptance until the rendi-
tion of verdict or entry of mistrial. In non-capital cases auto-
matic isolation is required only after the jury has been charged;
prior to the actual charging, isolation of the jurors is discretion-
ary with the court.99
It is safe to assume that where isolation or sequestration of
each juror is automatic from the moment of his acceptance, the
danger of exposure to prejudicial publicity arising during the
trial is appreciably minimized, pretermitting discussion of those
reported cases where, despite isolation, newspapers found their
way into the jury room. 100 The inconvenience to jurors and the
97. See Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961) ; Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir.
1952) ; Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1955) ; King v. United
States, 25 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1928).
98. See Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 217, 234 (1963).
99. See LA. R.S. 15:394 (1950) : "From the moment of the acceptance of any
juror until the rendition of verdict or the entry of a mistrial, as the case may be,
the jurors shall be kept together under the charge of an officer in such a way as
to be secluded from all outside communication; provided that in cases not capital
the judge may, in his discretion, permit the jurors to separate at any time before
the actual delivery of his charge."
100. See, e.g., United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 857 (2d Cir. 1951).
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additional expense for the state'1 which result from such early
mandatory isolation can perhaps be justified in capital cases,
but most legislatures have not recognized such justification in
cases less than capital. Consequently, mandatory isolation at
such an early stage is generally found only in capital cases. In
non-capital cases isolation of the jury prior to charging is dis-
cretionary with the court in most states, as in Louisiana. It is
submitted that this position is sound, and that mandatory isola-
tion of each juror should not automatically follow his selection
in all criminal cases.
Where isolation of jurors upon acceptance is not mandatory,
however, the efficacy of discretionary isolation as a remedy
against prejudicial publicity during the trial is doubtful. Usu-
ally the defendant will be able to obtain this relief only by re-
questing it. Defendants, however, are ordinarily reluctant to
request isolation of the jury during the trial from fear that
jurors who are thus inconvenienced may bear resentment to-
wards the accused or may compromise their verdict in order
to end the trial quickly. 10 2 Even if such reluctance did not exist,
there is still the problem that in many cases it cannot be deter-
mined beforehand that this remedy will be needed; often the
prejudicial publicity stems from a sudden incident during an
otherwise proper trial. 0 3
Mistrial and Reversal of Conviction
If publicity during the trial becomes so intense and preju-
dicial that a fair trial is impossible, the trial judge may declare
a mistrial. Also, as in the case of adverse pre-trial publicity,
a reviewing court may reverse the conviction if the trial did not
meet due process requirements or fell below the federal standard
for criminal justice in federal proceedings. This type of remedy
may well be the only effective one presently available to counter-
act prejudicial publicity arising during any type of criminal
trial. Its greatest inadequacy, however, is that it provides only
questionable deterrence to repeated instances of adverse pub-
licity; there is little assurance that the new trial will not be
marred in a similar way.
101. .For an illustration of the additional expense borne by a state solely be-
cause of prejudicial publicity during a trial, see the opinion of a very displeased
court in State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 987 (1965).
102. See FREE PRESS -FAIR TRIAL at 20.




As in the case of pre-trial publicity, an accused seeking relief
from prejudicial publicity arising during the trial must demon-
strate to the court's satisfaction the denial of due process. Al-
though none of the Supreme Court decisions have dealt specifi-
cally with publicity arising during the trial in state courts, there
is no reason why the standards of due process should be lower
in this instance than those applicable to prejudicial pre-trial pub-
licity, already discussed. Indeed, if a conclusion can be drawn
from the apparent disparity of standards in federal courts be-
tween pre-trial publicity and publicity during the trial, 1°4 it is
possible that the Supreme Court will require higher standards
with respect to prejudicial publicity during the trial. A possible
justification for a higher standard, at least in some instances, is
that prejudicial publicity during the trial potentially has an im-
mediate adverse effect on the jurors while pre-trial publicity
may abate by trial time.
Marshall v. United States1'0 is the leading case on publicity
occurring during a federal trial. Seven of the jurors admitted
reading with varying degrees of thoroughness newspaper ac-
counts of alleged prior illegal activity of the defendant. Earlier
the trial judge had ruled this very information inadmissible as
evidence. Each of the exposed jurors individually told the judge
that he would disregard the publicity and decide the case solely
on the evidence presented. The Supreme Court quoted the gen-
eral rule that the trial judge has great discretion in ruling on
possible prejudice resulting from the reading by jurors of news
articles concerning the trial. Recognizing that generalizations
beyond this rule are unprofitable because each case must turn
on its special facts, the Court, exercising its supervisory juris-
diction, reversed the conviction and granted a new trial. It held,
in effect, that the mere exposure of jurors to inadmissible infor-
mation constitutes prejudice to the accused, despite the jurors'
assurances of impartiality. Two years later the Supreme Court
reversed without opinion another federal conviction where the
jurors during the trial had read newspaper accounts and had
heard radio reports concerning prior convictions of the accused,
even though the jurors stated that they would not be influenced
by anything they had read or heard.'06
104. See discussion in -text accompanying note 114 infra.
105. 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
106. Janko v. United States, 366 U.S. 716 (1961).
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Applying this supervisory standard, the federal courts of
appeals have almost unanimously held that where the accused
demonstrates that some of the jurors have been exposed to
admittedly prejudicial information, which either was held in-
admissible or would have been inadmissible if offered, 1 7 he is
entitled to a new trial, irrespective of assurances by the jurors
that they have no opinion as to guilt or innocence.10 8 Only where
there was some factual basis of distinction between the situa-
tion presented and that found in Marshall have the reviewing
federal courts refused to reverse the conviction. 10 9
The federal standard seemingly requires, therefore, that ju-
rors not even read admittedly prejudicial material, and the ac-
cused need only demonstrate that some of his jurors have in fact
been exposed to the damaging publicity to obtain relief. 1 0
107. See Comment, 38 St. John's L. Rev. 136, 145 (1963), citing United
States v. Dellanmura, 142 N.Y.L.J. p. 3, col. 3-4 (July 8, 1959), and Coppedge
v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855
(1961). See also United States v. Alker, 180 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
108. See Adjmi v. United States, 346 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
86 Sup. Ct. 54 (1965) ; United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1962)
cert. denied, sub om. Guippone v. United States, 372 U.S. 959 (1963) United
States v. Kum Seng Seo, 300 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Feld-
man, 299 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1962), cert denied, 370 U.S. 910 (1962); United
States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Cohen v. United States, 297
F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962) ; United States v.
Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962) ; United
States v. Carlucci, 288 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied,' 366 U.S. 961
(1961); United States v. Coduto, 284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 881 (1961) ; Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961).
109. The following cases, cited in note 108 supra, used the indicated factual
bases of distinction : Adjmi v. United States (jurors read only headlines) ; United
States v. Agueci (routine publicity only); United States v. Feldman (publicity
read -by jury not detrimental to accused) ; Cohen v. United States (no showing
jurors read prejudicial publicity) ; United States v. Vita (merely innocuous pub-
licity read by jurors) ; United States v. Carlucci (admittedly prejudicial publicity
but jurors had not read the accounts but merely glanced at the headlines);
United States v. Coduto (no showing jurors read the publicity) ; United States
v. LaBarbara, 273 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1960) (no showing jurors read objection-
able publicity).
110. It seems clear that the accused must demonstrate that some of his jury
have been exposed to the prejudicial information (see United States v. Coduto,
284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1961) ; cert. denied, 365 U.S. 881 (1961) ; Cohen v.
United States, 297 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962) ;
United States v. LaBarbara, 273 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1960) ), or at least that he
attempted to demonstrate such exposure but was denied the opportunity by the
court (see United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962), concurring
opinion at 140, where it is pointed out in answer to the argument of the dissent
that there was no affirmative proof that any juror lind read any prejudicial
publicity that the defendant took the only course open to him in moving that
the trial judge ascertain whether any juror had been exposed to the informa-
tion which the judge declined to do on the basis that his cautionary instructions
would suffice).
COMMENTS
Apparently the only case in which a different standard was
applied was United States v. Largo.'11 There the federal court
of appeals refused to reverse a conviction where admittedly
prejudicial and inadmissible publicity was read by one juror,
for the reasons that the juror assured the court that nothing he
had read would affect his impartiality and there was "over-
whelming proof of the defendant's guilt.""12 A vigorous dissent
criticized the varying of federal standards according to the de-
gree of evidence of guilt as evaluated by reviewing appellate
judges."15
As most federal appellate courts have adopted the rule that
with respect to pre-trial publicity a juror need not necessarily
be disqualified merely because he has read the prejudicial mate-
rial,114 the federal standard for publicity arising during the trial
semes higher, if Largo is regarded as anomalous.
It should be noted that when federal reviewing courts re-
verse a federal conviction, the decree is usually pursuant to an
exercise of supervisory power over lower federal courts rather
than on the basis of a denial of due process. Consequently, in
seeking to ascertain the applicable federal standard it is diffi-
cult-to determine what constitutes due process in federal trials.
It has been proffered that the apparent reluctance to declare
what partiality of the jury renders a state trial violative of due
process may well be due to this indefiniteness of the federal con-
stitutional standard." 5
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
It should be apparent that none of the existing remedies for
prejudicial publicity is thoroughly effective, either alone or in
combination with others. Consequently, several possible solu-
tions have been proposed.
111. 346 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 240 (1965).
112. Id. at 256.
113. Id. at 257: "If I understand the majority correctly, this court is holding
that the standard of a fair trial in a criminal case varies with the degree of guilt
which we, as appellate judges, believe the evidence indicates. If the evidence of
guilt seems overwhelming, the standard is not as exacting as when the evidence
appears less conclusive. Such a variable standard, in my opinion, is antithetic
to the very concept of due process."
114. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
115. See Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 217, 221 (1963).
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A. Curtailing Divulgence of Prejudicial Information
Many writers on the subject have propounded the view that
the best way to eliminate the problem of prejudicial publicity is
to strike at the sources of the information. Various methods of
accomplishing this have been devised, depending upon the nature
of the source of information and the character of the sanction
to be employed.
Amendment and/or Enforcement of Canon 20
It is certain that prejudicial publicity is not the sole work
of news reporters. Were it not for "leaks" to the news media
from prosecuting and defense attorneys and law enforcement
officers, much prejudicial information would never get into print
or be broadcast. Canon 20 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
purports generally to oppose divulgence by an attorney of in-
formation relative to a case awaiting trial. The canon, however,
is written in equivocal language, which has not been clarified
by the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances. l"
Furthermore, there is apparently no case on record where dis-
ciplinary action was taken against an attorney for conduct
amounting to a violation of canon 20.11 For these reasons it
has been suggested that the Canons be amended so as to spell
out specifically what types of information attorneys should be
precluded from divulging, at least until disclosure at the trial.118
The New York State Bar Association has amended its canon to
this end ;119 the Philadelphia Bar Association is now experiment-
ing with a self-imposed plan of silence during criminal trials ;120
and the American Bar Association has taken action which may
result in nationwide amendment of canon 20.121 At least one
case, however, has' indicated that the present canon could be
"interpreted" so as to provide the desired result.122
There are many factors which make amendment and en-
forcement of the Professional Canons a desirable method of
controlling prejudicial publicity. This approach reaches one of
116. See Comment, 44 NEB. L. REV. 614, 628 n.71 (1965).
117. See BLAUSTEIN & 'ORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 271 (1954).
118. Griswold, Responsibility of the Legal Profession, HARVARD TODAY, p. 9
(Jan. 1965).
119. Comment, 44 NEr. L. REV. 614, 628 n.73 (1965).
120. Id. at 628 n.74.
121. Id. at 628 n.75.
122. State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 987 (1965).
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the principal sources of prejudicial information. In addition, it
avoids the charge of attacking the free press, as no sanctions
are imposed against the news media. Third, by attempting to
curtail misconduct of attorneys the bar will be in a better posi-
tion to argue for self-restraint and higher standards on the part
of the news media and law enforcement officers. Finally, such
an approach is the most honorable, and best vindicates the in-
tegrity of the profession. 1 23
Regulation of Law Enforcement Officers Without Contempt
Process or Legislation
It has been urged that law enforcement officers should adopt
standards, similar to those suggested for the bar, concerning in-
formation that may be divulged in criminal cases. 124 Although
the likelihood of such action on the state level may seem remote,
the Justice Department has adopted a statement of policy gov-
erning what information will be made available to the press.12r
This statement of policy, of course, is binding only on the named
federal officials.
Contempt Process
It has been strongly advocated that contempt process be used
against the primary sources of prejudicial information where
voluntary standards of forbearance either are not adopted or
are not complied with. 126 Although successful contempt proceed-
ings against the press may not be a realistic expectation, 27 the
contempt action in this instance would be directed against the
divulgers of prejudicial information rather than against the
press for publishing such information. Attorneys, as officers
of the court, are susceptible to judicial disciplinary action; their
divulgence of damaging material hampers the fair administra-
123. See Comment, 44 NED. L. REV. 614, 629 (1965).
124. See Griswold, Responsibility of the Legal Profession, HARVARD TODAY,
p. 9 (Jan. 1965).
125. See Katzenbach. According to the statement, the following types of
information will not be released by the Justice Department: statements, admis-
sions, confessions, or alibis attributable to a defendant; statements concerning
evidence or argument in the case, whether or not it is anticipated that such evi-
dence or argument will be used at trial : "editorializing" such as labeling the
defendant a "mad dog sex killer," or characterizing a forthcoming proceeding
as "an open and shut case," or publicly appraising the credibility of a witness.
126. State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 987 (1965).
127. See discussion accompanying notes 142-157 infra.
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tion of justice.12 Law enforcement officers who release to the
press undesirable information likewise interfere with the proper
administration of justice, and such action constitutes conduct
unbecoming a police officer, warranting discipline "at the hands
of the proper authorities."' 1 29
Legislation
A final means suggested to curtail divulgence of prejudicial
information is the adoption of appropriate legislation. The pro-
posed legislation would make divulgence of prejudicial informa-
tion either a distinct criminal offense or conduct punishable by
contempt. An example of the latter type of legislation is the
Morse Bill, which provides "contempt-of-court penalties for any
federal employee or any defendant or defense lawyer" who di-
vulges for publication any "information not already properly
filed with the court which might affect the outcome of any pend-
ing criminal litigation."'180 As in the case of contempt process
this proposed legislation is directed against the sources of
prejudicial information, not against the news media.
B. Curtailing Publication of Prejudicial Information
Internal (Voluntary) Control of the Press
It has been suggested that the press adopt a voluntary code
of conduct regarding crime reporting. 18 1 Such a solution would
be very desirable in that it would avoid any interference with
freedom of the press. Some journalists have indicated that if
reasonable standards were prescribed most newspapers would
128. State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 987 (1965).
129. I bid.
130. S. No. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965): "A bill to protect the integrity
of the court and jury functions iu criminal cases."
131. See Report of the Warren Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy 47 (N.Y. Times ed. 1964) : -The Commission recommends that the rep-
resentatives of the bar, law enforcement associations, and the news media work
together to establish ethical standards concerning the collection and presentation
of information to the public so that there will 'be no interference with pending
criminal investigations, court proceedings, or the right of individuals to a fair
trial."
Notice has been taken that the American Society of Newspaper Editors
•adopted Canons of Journalism in 1923 which include provisions relevant to
prejudicial publicity and these Canons are still recognized by the Society of
Editors, although there is no record of their having been approved by the Ameri-




gladly comply. 132 However, it has been said that some news-
papers believe they must emphasize morbid and shocking crime
news in order to prosper ;13 3 others justify extensive publicity
on the basis that one obligation of their profession is to attempt
to reduce crime. 134 A further justification offered is that there
is a constitutional guarantee of a public trial and the public has
a "right to know."1 35 The answer to this latter contention is that
the provision for a public trial is for the protection of the ac-
cused. 13 6 The Federal Constitution mentions no other beneficiary
of this right.137 The access of the press to a trial stems from
the right of the defendant to a fair trial and the assumption
that the press will further this end. It is a right which can and,
at times, has been waived, 3 " in which event the public and the
press may be excluded. 139
Assuming that such self-restraint would be accepted by most
of the press, various methods could be used to assure extensive
compliance. The use of a system of accreditation has been sug-
gested whereby only news media and reporters who complied
with the voluntary standards would be accredited and therefore
extended courtroom privileges. 4 0 A further sanction for com-
pliance could be limiting membership in various newspaper or-
ganizations, such as the American Newspaper Publishers' Asso-
ciation and the American Society of Newspaper Editors, to those
who adhere to the voluntary standards.'41
132. See Comment, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 217, 237 n.87 (1963).
133. Id. at 238 n.90.
134. Id. at 238 n.91.
135. See Will, Free Press v. Fair Trial, 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 197, 201 n.16
(1963).
136. See Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir.
1958); United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954);
cf. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1947). But see E. E. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100
Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955).
137. The sixth amendment is the only constitutional provision which speaks
of a right to a public trial and in that provision only the accused is afforded
the right. See note 5 supra.
138. See Will, Free Press v. Fair Trial, 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 197, 203 n.21
(1963), citing United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949).
139. Id. at 204 n.22, citing United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123
N.E.2d 777 (1954).
140. See Wright, A Judge's View: The News Media and Criminal Justice, 50
A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126 (1964). Query as to the constitutionality of this proposal.
141. See Comment, 44 NEB. L. REV. 614, 631 (1965), where this proposal is
discussed and its effectiveness as a sanction is affirmed because of the many
benefits membership in these organizations affords.
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External Control of the Press
Contempt by Publication
The English judiciary forbids pre-trial and during-the-trial
publication of much of the information about the accused, and it
enforces these restrictions through its power of contempt.142
Because of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech
and of the press, the contempt power of the courts has never
been as pervasive in the United States, and in recent years it
has met with even greater limitations. After the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the contempt provision of the Judicial Code 1 43
in Nye v. United States144 federal courts, pursuant to statutory
authorization can punish the press by contempt proceedings only
if the contempt is committed either in the courtroom or in the
vicinity of the court itself.145
In state courts the contempt power was at first very broad, 146
but it was severely limited by the Supreme Court in a series of
decisions beginning with Bridges v. California,147 in 1941. The
Court there held that the first amendment, made applicable to
the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, forbade punishment by contempt for comment on
any pending case in the absence of a showing that the state-
ments created a "clear and present danger" to the administra-
tion of justice. The Court stated that it would be the final judge
of what constituted a "clear and present danger" and would de-
termine this by examining the facts of each case. 148 Comments
directed at the trial judge sitting without a jury were held not
to meet the required test.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the "clear and present dan-
ger" test in Pennekamp v. Florida,49 Craig v. Harney,"50 and
more recently in Wood v. Georgia."' It is important to note,
,142. See discussion of the English contempt power in Jaffe, Trial by News-
paper, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 504, 505 (1965).
143. Judicial Code § 268, 36 Stat. 1163, 28 U.S.C. § 385 (1911).
144. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
145. It should be noted, however, that Nye involved only a question of statu-
tory interpretation rather than a rule of constitutional law and it is conceivable,
therefore, that Congress could validly draft a broader grant of contempt power.
146. For a discussion of the state contempt power prior to 1941 see Comment,
33 FORDHAM L. REV. 61, 65 (1964).
147. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
148. Id. at 271.
149. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
150. 331 U.S. 367 (1047).
151. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
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however, that none of these cases involved trial by jury.152
Indeed, special note was taken of this fact in two of the cases.1
53
It has been inferred from this language that the Court might
require a less rigid test for upholding contempt-by-publication
convictions where a jury trial is involved. In evaluating this
possibility, however, it is necessary to consider Maryland v.
Baltimore Radio Show.1 54 A Maryland trial court adjudged a
radio station in contempt for broadcasting news of the arrest,
confession, and prior criminal record of the accused. The deci-
sion was reversed by the Maryland court of appeals on the basis
that the broadcast was protected by Bridges, Pennekamp, and
Craig, in that it did not constitute a "clear and present danger"
to the administration of justice. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari, 15 5 but Justice Frankfurter wrote an opinion carefully
pointing out that a refusal to grant certiorari was not equivalent
to affirmance. 15
At best, it is doubtful whether the Supreme Court will apply
any standard other than the "clear and present danger" test
when considering the validity of contempt-by-publication judg-
ments. Even assuming arguendo that a lesser standard might
be applied where trial by jury was involved, serious doubt re-
mains as to the desirability of this method as a deterrent to
prejudicial publicity. As the Supreme Court has demonstrated, 57
the validity of a contempt conviction will depend upon an ex-
amination of the particular facts of each case. The news media,
therefore, would have no definitive standards by which to deter-
mine what constitutes a contumacious publication. Although
152. Although a grand jury was involved in hood, it was merely conducting
a grand jury investigation into a matter of general community interest (alleged
bloc vote purchasing by local political candidates), rather than deciding whether
to bring charges against a particular defendant. Id. at 389, 390.
153. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962): "First it is important to
emphasize that this case does not represent a situation where an individual is on
trial; there was no 'judicial proceeding pending' in the sense that prejudice
might result to one litigant or the other by ill-considered misconduct aimed at
influencing the outcome of a trial or a grand jury proceeding."
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348 (1946): "The comments were
made about judges of courts of general jurisdiction-judges selected by the
people of a populous and educated community. They concerned the attitude
of the judges toward those who were charged with crime, not comments on
evidence or rulings during a jury trial. Their effect on juries that might
eventually try the alleged offenders against the criminal laws of Florida is
too remote for discussion."
154. 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949).
155. 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
156. Ibid.
157. See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
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such a situation might lead to greater restraint on the part of
the news media from uncertainty as to what type of publicity
might constitute contempt, it is submitted that such a restraint
is unnecessary and unwarranted. The success of a remedy for
prejudicial publicity will depend in large measure upon coopera-
tion by the news media and cooperation hardly will be engen-
dered through such a use of contempt process.
Legislation
The more favored means of external control of the press is
legislation. Of the various types of proposed statutes 158 the usual
pattern is to set forth specific types of publications which the
legislature would consider a "clear and present danger" to the
administration of justice. Publication of such matters would be
a criminal offense, punishable by fine and/or imprisonment. By
making the sanction a result only of criminal proceedings, rather
than of use of the contempt power, it is argued that the legisla-
tion would more likely be sustained by the Supreme Court since
the publisher would not be held responsible unless he had been
proceeded against by indictment or information, been found
guilty by a jury, and failed to receive relief after exercising his
right of appeal. Such a statute has received "initial approval"
by the Massachusetts legislature. 1 9 It is improbable, however,
that the Supreme Court will allow the states to determine what
specific matters, if publicized, will constitute a "clear and present
danger" to the administration of justice, rather than continue to
hold that this determination rests ultimately with the Court it-
self.16 o
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that prejudicial publicity must be recognized
as a serious problem. The existing procedural remedies, includ-
ing reversals of convictions, are inadequate for various reasons,
even assuming greater liberality of the courts in granting them.
It is felt that the better approach is to curtail the prejudicial
158. See Jaffe, T'rial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.I.. IREV. 504 (1965) ; Comments,
33 FORDHAm L. REV. 61, 75 n.104 (1964), 57 NEB. U.L. REV. 217, 250 (1963).
159. See Comment, 42 U. DET. L.J. 504, 506 n.l (1965).
160. With reference to determination of a clear and present danger see Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 347, 374 (1927): "[\V]here a statute is valid only in
case certain conditions exist, the enactment of the statute cannot alone establish
the facts which are essential to its validity." (Concurring opinion.)
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publicity itself, rather than attempt to avoid its adverse effects
on a criminal proceeding. There seems little justification for pre-
trial disclosure of the confession of the accused, or even of the
fact that he has confessed. The prejudicial effect such informa-
tion may have upon the future jurors far outweighs the public
value, if any, obtained from its publication. For the same reason
it is submitted that revelation of a defendant's prior criminal
activity before such information is disclosed during the trial
itself is unjustified. Such publicity is antithetical to the funda-
mental concepts of criminal justice in this country. Unless the
defendant's prior criminal activity is made known at trial for
one of its limited purposes, it is irrelevant to the determination
of his guilt or innocence. Unauthorized knowledge by the jurors
of an alleged history of misconduct, is almost certain to jeopar-
dize the defendant's right to a fair trial. The same rationale
can be applied to other types of admittedly prejudicial publicity.
In considering the best means of avoiding such publicity, it
is submitted that before direct control is attempted, there should
be serious negotiations between representatives of the bar, the
law enforcement services, and the news media. The purpose of
these negotiations should be to determine whether certain types
of publicity can be mutually recognized as undesirable and can
therefore be avoided, either by voluntary codes of ethics or by
acquiescence in legislative sanctions against both the divulgence
and the publication of the undesirable publicity. It is felt that
such an approach can go far toward achieving the necessary
improvement, if it is recognized that failure to obtain a solution
might result in court-made requirements and sanctions of pos-
sibly greater harshness.
Whether or not accord can be reached between the interests
concerned, however, it is submitted that the bar must recognize
its duty to adopt the necessary standards with respect to what
types of information attorneys in a criminal proceeding may not
divulge and to enact adequate sanctions to assure compliance. In
the interests of justice the bar should recognize and accept the
further duty to press for legislation aimed at curtailing other
divulgence of prejudicial information and the dissemination of
prejudicial publicity.
Paul H. Du
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